Abstract

Reflexivity is valuable in social research because it draws attention to the researcher as part of the world being studied and reminds us that the individuals involved in our research are subjects, not objects. By being reflexive we acknowledge that we cannot be separated from our biographies. This book is a defence of reflexivity but it also identifies issues and concerns which currently plague mainstream sociological operationalisations of a positivistic form of reflexivity in some accounts of research. It argues for the extension of reflexivity into domains otherwise neglected in public accounts, and a shift from reflexivity as an individualised quality of the researcher (used to judge peers and to naval-gaze), to a feminist, collaborative, reflexive sensibility which is (ethically) mindful of the wider contexts shaping the knower and the construction, negotiation and contestation of knowledge(s) and experience(s). Crucially, a mindful reflexive sensibility and approach seeks to avoid the pitfalls of the present positivist-version-of-reflexivity emerging in predictable reflexive accounts which focus on the latest fad. It also attends to the gap in relation to reflexivity in theory, method and practice by drawing together scholarly work in each of these domains and providing examples of reflexivity in action.

INTRODUCTION: REFLEXIVITIES AND REFLECTION

... you must learn to use your life experience in your intellectual work: continually to examine and interpret it. In this sense craftsmanship is the center of yourself and you are personally involved in every intellectual product upon which you work. To say that you can ‘have experience’, means, for one thing, that your past plays into and affects your present, and that it defines your capacity for future experience. As a social scientist, you have to control this rather elaborate
As the above quote from C. Wright Mills demonstrates, reflexivity is wrapped up in intellectual craftsmanship and we are personally involved in every research project we work on. The value of reflexivity is now largely accepted by qualitative researchers and it has helped to address the sanitised nature of research accounts which traditionally featured in methods textbooks. Reflexivity is valuable in that it draws attention to the researcher as part of the world being studied while reminding us that those individuals involved in our research are subjects, not objects. By being reflexive we acknowledge that social researchers cannot be separated from their autobiographies and will bring their values to the research and how they interpret the data (Devine & Heath, 1999).

Reflexivity highlights the messy nature of the social world and therefore social research, including the complex and myriad power contests and relations which must be negotiated and the implications that must be attended to in the course of our research – from design through to data collection, analysis, dissemination and application. It also extends to the contexts and cultures of knowledge production – including research users, participants, funders, universities, publics, and the disciplinary fields we operate within / between / across. It is increasingly likely today that academics will be working across disciplines, which has further implications for the identity of the researcher and the field/s they inhabit.

There are numerous definitions and operationalizations of reflexivity as will be made clear in this book. Lynch refers to a ‘confusing array of versions of reflexivity’ (2000, pp. 27). Although social scientists now tend to agree on the importance of being reflexive, they do not share a coherent conception of what ‘being reflexive’ means or how to practice reflexivity. The etymological root of the term reflexive means ‘to bend backwards upon oneself’ in contrast to reflection which entails thinking about something after the
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event (Finlay and Gough, 2003, pp. ix). Gough (2003) proposes that we use the plural term ‘reflexivities’ in order to address the assumption that reflexivity is something which we can all agree on and which can be captured, and to signify plurality, flexibility and conflict.

Feminist psychologist Sue Wilkinson (1988) argues that at its simplest reflexivity involves ‘disciplined self-reflection.’ She distinguishes between three forms of reflexivity. First, ‘personal reflexivity’ (akin to what others have termed ‘self-reflexivity’ (Lather, 1993) or ‘recognition of self’ (Pillow, 2003)) which focuses on the researcher’s own identity where research becomes ‘an expression of personal interests and values’ and is thus an essential aspect of the feminist research paradigm. This form of reflexivity recognizes the reciprocal relationship between life experiences and research. Second, ‘functional reflexivity’ involves reflection on the nature of the research enterprise including the choice of method and the construction of knowledge in order to reveal assumptions, values and biases. Third, ‘disciplinary reflexivity’ focuses on the form and development of a discipline or sub-discipline. This includes, for instance, how the traditional paradigm of psychology has operated to exclude women and stall development of a feminist psychology (Wilkinson, 1988, pp. 494-495).

In their book *Reflexive Methodologies*, Alvesson and Sköldberg (2009) claim that different uses of reflexivity or reflection make us aware of the complex relationship between processes of knowledge production and the various contexts of such processes, including the involvement of the knowledge producer. They propose that reflective research has the characteristics of interpretation and reflection. Firstly, all references to empirical data are the result of interpretation. Here, ‘the idea that measurements, observations, the statements of interview subjects, and the study of secondary data such as statistics or archival data have an unequivocal or unproblematic relationship to anything outside the empirical material is rejected on principle’ (Alvesson & Sköldberg, 2009, pp. 9). This calls for awareness of theoretical assumptions, language and prior
understanding of social phenomena. Secondly, reflection involves turning attention ‘inwards’ to focus on the researcher, the researched, society more generally, the intellectual and cultural traditions, and the ‘problematic nature of language and narrative’ in the research setting (2009, pp. 9). Therefore, reflective research is related to the selection of the research topic, the research context, relationships with/between the researched, the choices made in relation to the management and conduct of data collection (and while in the field), the representation of cultures, individuals and the social world, and also the power dynamics and relations implicated, generated and created via research and reflection. Reflexivity also extends beyond the individual academic to include acknowledgment of the limits of knowledge associated with the social scientist’s membership and position in the intellectual field (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992).

Reflexivity is difficult (Alvesson & Sköldberg, 2009). It is not merely a quality of the researcher, but is a practice which must be honed, applied, and kept in mind throughout the research process. As May argues:

Writings on reflexivity tend to be manuals that provide steps for the practitioner to become more reflexive. What is replicated is an inductivism that separates content, character, and context. There are no easy routes and no self-help books with ten steps to ‘becoming reflexive’. (with Perry, 2011, pp. 6)

This book reviews, consolidates, and aims to reinvigorate discussions and debates concerning reflexivity in the social sciences. It does not provide the reader with steps to follow in order to ‘become’ reflexive or instructions on how to ‘practice’ reflexivity. All too often reflexivity, in its current incarnation, is employed in the social sciences as a means of judging the merits of social research, or of the individual researcher, and this is particularly the case in qualitative research. As Trinh (1989) asks, how do you ‘inscribe difference without bursting into a series of euphoric narcissistic accounts of yourself and your kind’ (pp. 28)? Reflexivity is to an extent a buzzword (May with Perry, 2011) or the
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Current fad (Patai, 1994) in social science research. Questions are often posed to social researchers by their peers such as: ‘have you been reflexive’, ‘have you been reflexive enough?’, ‘have you reflected on X, or Y, or Z?’ Equally, on being advised of the merits of reflexivity, students will ask ‘what should I reflect on?’ Reflexivity in this sense risks being adopted as a disciplinary mechanism for the policing of social scientific research and researchers. It also risks being wrapped up with/in the individual identity of the researcher, while failing to recognize the wider disciplinary, institutional and political context(s) in which reflexivity or being reflexive takes place, and in which knowledge is constructed, situated and (re)negotiated. Finally, it risks the production of a tick box list of which aspects of identity should be reflected on. For example, gender is often privileged in reflexive accounts at the expense of other aspects of researcher and participant identities such as race, ethnicity, class, etc. (See Chapter 1). We should also avoid outlining ‘steps’ for students/researchers to follow in order to be reflexive, as if reflexivity is something which can be done ‘correctly’ or ‘incorrectly’. Johnson (1981) draws attention to the inadequacies of immediacy, of belief in the self-presentation of meaning which ‘seems to guarantee the notions that in the spoken word we know what we mean, mean what we say, say what we mean, and know what we have said’ (p. viii). We need to acknowledge that there will aspects of our performance as a researcher that we cannot access or research, ‘much that eludes the logic of the self-present subject. But situated so as to give testimony and witness to what is happening …’ (Lather, 1993, pp. 685)

After interpretivism and the postmodern turn in social research methods, the question remains of how to ‘deal with the fact of reflexivity, how to strategize about it for certain theoretical and intellectual interests’ (Marcus, 1993, pp. 394, Lather, 1993). Marcus argues for a ‘reflexive, messy text’ in which we are aware of our own narrative apparatuses:
that are sensitive to how reality is socially constructed, and that understanding that writing is a way of framing reality. Messy texts are many sited, intertextual, always open ended, and resistant to theoretical holism, but always committed to cultural criticism. (1998, pp. 392)

In order to continue this conversation – about what it means to be reflexive – Pillow (2003) argues for ‘reflexivities of discomfort’ or ‘interrupted reflexivity’, in which we render the ‘knowing’ of ourselves and subjects as ‘uncomfortable and uncontainable’ (pp. 188). As we will see in Chapter 2, post-qualitative researchers have challenged the taken for granted assumptions and norms around what is ‘acceptable’ research practice while also ‘foreframing the necessity of engaging in critical reflection about how it is we do the reflexive work of subjectivity and representation’ (Pillow, 2003, pp. 188). I argue that new materialist analyses have caricatured reflexivity, setting it up as a straw (wo)man in their adoption of an ‘inflationary logic’ (Ahmed, 2008) in which they confuse reflexivity and reflection as both involving ‘mirroring’ and ‘sameness’, when reflexivity has ‘difference’ at its very core. Post-qualitative inquiry also ironically re-turns privileged focus to the researcher/s, rather than on the ethics and politics of research, and the research communities we are engaging with. Many of the central concerns of those proponents of diffraction can also be found at the heart of definitions and practices of reflexivity and/or reflective practice, which highlights a further issue with many new materialist approaches – the setting up of these approaches as ‘new’.

I argue that reflexivity focuses on the unfamiliar, the uncomfortable, the messy, difference/s, and writing up our failures (cf Pillow, 2003). A reflexive approach enables us to be conscious of the social, ethical and political impact of our research, the central, fluid and changing nature/s of power relations (with participants, gatekeepers, research funders, etc.) and our relationships with the researched, aspects which diffractive methodologies overlook. Reflexivity is and (can be) creative and involve re-readings of, and re-turnings to our writing and texts (as the chapters on reflexivity in action
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It can also enable us to engage with non-human agents in our research. I propose that instead of replacing reflexivity with diffraction we need to focus on the further development and discussion of reflexivity’s current uses and incarnations as a methodology and methodological tool in qualitative research. Crucially, we must consider reflexivity and reflective practices in the context of collaborative research with various research communities, and the politics of these relationships and therefore reflexivity itself.

In what follows below, I briefly outline some of the main conceptualizations of reflexivity in social theory and research methods. This is by no means a complete account (and for a comprehensive overview of reflexivity and methodology see Alvesson and Sköldberg’s (2009) *Reflective Methodologies*). The former includes the work of sociologist Max Weber, reflexivity in ethnomethodology, Beck, Giddens and Lash’s work on ‘reflexive modernization’, Archer’s ‘reflexive imperative’, and Bourdieu’s call for a ‘reflexive sociology’. I then provide an overview of the ‘reflexive turn’ in relation to feminist research methods and ethnography, which are both discussed in greater detail in Chapters 1 and 3 respectively. The remainder of the chapter then considers some of the current issues which plague a mainstream conceptualization of reflexivity in terms of qualitative research in the social sciences, before providing an overview of the contents of the book.

**REFLEXIVITY AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES**

*Reflexivity in Philosophy and Social Theory*

The ability of humans to reflect has a long intellectual history and heritage growing out of Enlightenment belief in the ability to reflect in a reasonable manner about our fate, our impact on the future, and our ability to be able to transcend the present (Pillow, 2003). Reflexive philosophies and theories in the social sciences can be traced from the early writings of Immanuel Kant (2007[1781]) who championed the idea of reflexive philosophical judgement, and Friedrich Nietzsche who viewed every great philosophy,
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including the Kantian system, as ‘a confession on the part of its author and a kind of involuntary and unconscious memoir’ (1996, pp. 37). G.H. Mead (1962[1934]) describes reflexivity as a turning back of one’s experience upon oneself, and focuses on a self which is socially constructed. In this sense, reflexivity is a ‘circular process, in which reflexivity is the guiding relationship allowing for the circularity’ (Steier, 1991, pp. 2).

According to Caetano (2015) reflexivity is central to all sociological theory and approaches because it deals with the central question of the interplay between structure and agency.

It is important to distinguish between reflexivity in the philosophical sciences as an ideal of reflection, from reflexivity and self-reflexivity as research methods in the social sciences (Pillow, 2003). The problem of reflexivity is inherited from Max Weber’s idea of sociology, and was then transformed by phenomenology and ethnomethodology, and deepened via the linguistic turn of hermeneutics and Wittgenstein’s later philosophy (Bonner, 2001). In his seminal book *The Methodology of the Social Sciences* (1949), Weber outlines the importance of developing a value free sociology. For Weber, sociology is the interpretive understanding of social action undertaken by individuals in society. Because individuals must also take into account the actions of others, which therefore guides and orientates their behaviours, they can be seen as reflexive (Weber, 1947).\(^1\) Weber’s concept of *verstehen* highlights that understanding social action also involves understanding the self and an understanding of social actors, because this is what constitutes social action as social. Therefore, Weber made the question of reflexivity central to the sociological method and the discipline. He views it as is the job of the sociologist who interprets action to ‘reflect both on the member’s reflexivity and on his/her own reflexivity (Bonner, 2001, pp. 268).

**Phenomenology and Ethnomethodology: Reflexivity as Unavoidable**

In phenomenology and ethnomethodology which emerged in the 1960s, reflexivity is claimed to avoid the academic pretentions and divisions that can arise with conflating
reflexivity with ‘a particular intellectual orientation, cultural condition or political
perspective’ (Lynch, 2000, pp. 27). The work of Schutz (1954) and Garfinkel’s (1967)
ethnomethodological programme (see also Garfinkel & Sacks, 1970, Blum & McHugh,
1984) highlight the intertwining of theoretical, substantive, and methodological
considerations of reflexivity. Garfinkel (1967) highlights the ‘reflexive’ or ‘incarnate’
character of accounting practices and accounts. In this approach, reflexivity is seen as
unremarkable and mundane. It is an ‘unavoidable feature of the way actions are
performed, made sense of and incorporated into social settings. In this sense of the
word, it is impossible to be unreflexive’ (Lynch, 2001, pp. 26-27). Reflexivity in
ethnomethodology is not akin to reflection, but is instead used to describe ‘…the acausal
and non-mentalistic determination of meaningful action-in-context’ (Lynch & Peyrot,
1992, pp. 113). Therefore, for ethnomethodologists there is no one way street between
the researcher and the object of study (Alvesson & Sköldberg, 2009). The two influence
each other throughout the research process. Pollner (1991) argues that a radical version
of this original ethnomethodological reflexivity has been compromised by later writers
who have adopted a more conventional position (see also Alvesson & Sköldberg, 2009).

**Reflexive Modernization**

A further body of social theory dealing explicitly with reflexivity is the work of Anthony
Giddens (1990), Scott Lash (1994) and Ulrich Beck (1999, 2009) and their discussions of
‘reflexive modernization’. In their work they characterise between a previous ‘simple
modernity’ (Lash, 1994) (which is modern by the way in which it characterises the
relationship between the individual and society) and a current form of modernity referred
to as ‘late modernity’. In this latter reflexive period of modernity, the agent is ‘freed’ from
traditional societal structures and has increasing opportunities to reflect upon itself and
deconstruct the social world through which it was constituted (Quicke, 1997). They draw
on the economic sphere to demonstrate the freeing of the agent from these structures.
For example, ‘capital accumulation could not take place without agency freeing itself from
the “rules” of mass consumption and “Fordist” structures of production’ (Quicke, 1991,
Consumption also becomes as important as production in the construction of identity (Quicke, 1991). Individualisation has impacted on the family structure, the nation, and the state. In relation to self-identity, the self of modernity is ‘open, differentiated, reflective and individuated, and this is even more true of the period of reflexive modernity’ (Quicke, 1997, pp.142). However, as Beck, Bonss and Lau argue, the ‘reflexivity’ in ‘reflexive modernization’ is often misunderstood:

It is not simply a redundant way of emphasizing the self-referential quality that is a constitutive part of modernity. Instead, what ‘reflexive modernization’ refers to is a distinct second phase: the modernization of modern society. When modernization reaches a certain stage it radicalizes itself. It begins to transform, for a second time, not only the key institutions but also the very principles of society. But this time the principles and institutions being transformed are those of modern society. (2003, pp. 1)

In ‘reflexive modernization, ‘reflexive’ does not mean that people today lead a more conscious life. Instead, it refers to:

…not an ‘increase of mastery and consciousness, but a heightened awareness that mastery is impossible’ (Latour, 2003). Simple modernization becomes reflexive modernization to the extent that it disenchants and then dissolves its own taken-for-granted premises. (Beck, Bonss & Lau, 2003, pp. 3)

As a result of this reflexive awareness the nation-state (including the legal system, economy, welfare state, democracy, and corporations) and the traditional structures of social institutions and life (i.e. the ‘normal’ career, family and life-history) are all undermined, questioned and (re)negotiated (Beck, Bonss & Lau, 2003).
The concept of ‘reflexive modernization’ developed in two (somewhat overlapping) directions (see Beck, 2009). First, Giddens and Lash argue that reflexive modernization is associated with knowledge (reflection) with regards to the foundations, consequences and problems of modernization. However, for Ulrich Beck, reflexive modernization is the consequence of the ‘side affects’ of modernization. His ‘risk society’ (1999) thesis for example demonstrates how in risk societies, ‘...the consequences and successes of modernization become an issue with the speed and radicality of processes of modernization’ (Beck, 2009, pp. 6). As Beck argues when distinguishing his approach from the former reflexive modernization thesis of Giddens and Lash:

In the first case, one could speak of reflection (narrowly constructed), in the second, of the reflexivity (in the wider sense) of modernization – in the wider sense because reflexivity, in addition to reflection (knowledge), also involves the idea of a ‘reflex’ in the sense of the (preventive) effect of not knowing. (2009, pp. 119, original emphasis)

Giddens (1990) also distinguishes between reflexivity as a defining characteristic of all human action – what he terms ‘the reflexive monitoring of action’ (pp. 36), and a sense of reflexivity which is explicitly related to modernity and which is ‘introduced into the very basis of systematic reproduction, such that thought and action are constantly refracted back upon one another’ (pp. 38). Therefore, here, the reflexivity of social life involves the constant examination of social practices and the reforming of these ‘in light of incoming information about those very practices, thus constitutively altering their character’ (pp. 38). Giddens also coins the term ‘institutionalized reflexivity’ to refer to the treatment of scientific and expert knowledge concerning the principles of social action:

This authorized knowledge deflects social conduct from its prescribed courses and integrates it into new contexts ... it is the motor of change in structures and forms of social action. (Beck, 2009, pp. 121)
According to Beck there is an issue with the above approach in that some forms of knowledge (including reflection) are relevant for traditional societies, not only modern societies. Therefore, the universality of the concept of reflection is a problem for any epistemology of reflexive modernization (Beck, 2009). Beck distinguishes his work on reflexive modernization from others such as Giddens and Lash by arguing that his focus is on: ‘the medium’ of reflexive modernization which for Beck is not ‘knowledge’ but is ‘more or less – reflexive – non-knowledge’ (2009, pp. 122).

Lash argues that Beck and Giddens’ conceptualizations of reflexivity rest on a narrowly cognitivist understanding of reflection (Beck, 2009). Lash (1994) places the emphasis on ‘reflexive communities’. He distinguishes between ‘cognitive’, ‘moral’ and ‘aesthetic reflection’, focusing on the emotional peculiarities of the latter. It is these aspects of aesthetic reflection which cannot be reduced to emotional, cognitive or moral elements and thus give rise to ‘reflexive communities’ (Beck, 2009).

*The ‘Reflexive Imperative’*

Drawing on *Studies in Ethnomethodology*, Archer refers to Garfinkel’s ‘universal reflexivity’ which is part of being a member of society. However, Archer’s reflexivity is different in that she develops what she calls an ‘extended reflexivity’. Her work also differs from the ‘reflexive modernization thesis’ discussed above because she does not see reflexivity as the new kid on the block, arriving during late modernity. As she argues:

> No reflexivity; no society, is also premised upon no culture ever being so comprehensive and coherent in its composition and no structure ever being so commanding or consistent in its organization as to maintain an enduring form of social life without making constant resort to the reflexively derived actions of its members. (2012, pp. 2)
Her work on the ‘reflexive imperative’ attempts to sociologically analyse reflexivity at the empirical level, while her ideas are grounded in historical and sociological research (i.e. see Archer, 2003a[1995], 2003b, 2007, 2010, 2012). As a critical realist, Archer argues that agents and structures are distinct and neither are primary over the other. She defines reflexivity as: ‘… the regular exercise of the mental ability, shared by all normal people, to consider themselves in relation to their (social) contexts and vice-versa’ (2012, pp.1). The drive for individuals to follow the reflexive imperative stems from the lack of social guidelines available to individuals on what to do in new situations. She refers to her approach as ‘morphogenetic’:

The ‘morpho’ element is an acknowledgement that society has no pre-set form or preferred state: the ‘genetic’ part is a recognition that it takes its shape from, and is formed by, agents, originating from the intended and unintended consequences of their activities. (Archer, 2003a [1995], pp.5)

Therefore ‘morphogenesis’ permits consideration of structural conditioning, social interaction and also structural elaboration. Archer argues that for the first time in history, the imperative to ‘be reflexive’ is becoming important for all individuals, however it manifests itself only in the most developed parts of the world (Archer, 2012). Each situation requires that individuals are able to draw on their socially dependent and personal powers of reflexivity in order to define their course of action in relation to the novelty of their circumstances. For Archer there is a positive aspect to the reflexive imperative in that it gives individuals the opportunity to pursue what they care most about in society and their ‘personal concerns become their compasses’ (2012, pp. 1). The negative side to the reflexive imperative is that individuals can also pursue courses of action which do not align with their social concerns and therefore ‘whose negative outcomes rebound back on them’ (2012, pp.1). Archer believes that any form of social order depends on the exercise of human reflexivity. This argument rests on three counts. First, reflexive first-person awareness and a ‘sense of self’ is ‘indispensable’ in even the
smallest societies ‘because without it, no rule, expectation, obligation and so forth could be incumbent upon anyone in particular’ (Archer, 2012, pp. 2). Second, the feasibility of tradition and traditional practices are based on this ‘reflexive monitoring for competent performance, for coping when things go wrong and for meeting unexpected contingencies’ (Archer, 2012, pp. 2). Third, the traditional guidelines may be in conflict with one another because ‘there is no guarantee that all norms are complementary at any given time’ (Archer, 2012, pp. 2).

For Archer, reflexivity in late modernity in intensified due to the reinforcing changes in cultural and social structures. These changes result from ‘an unprecedented acceleration of morphogenesis in these two spheres simultaneously, rather than from the diminished importance of structure’ (2012, pp. 3-4). Thus, for Archer, the reflexive imperative is not directly tied to modernity, and it is structure, culture and agency together which make history. Moreover, she argues that the latest cycle of modernity ‘appears to be giving way to a morphogenesis that is increasingly unbound at its morphogenetic fetters’ (2012, pp. 4). Here, she is referring to the role of reflexivity in reaching into the past, and to the future, through its effects on our actions.

‘Reflexive Sociology’ and the Scientific Field

Pierre Bourdieu’s call for a ‘reflexive sociology’ has been influential in that it allows for consideration of reflexivity in relation to the (politics) of the scientific field. For Bourdieu, reflexivity should be a collective enterprise. His reflexive sociology seeks to ‘buttress the epistemological security of sociology’ (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992, pp. 36). According to Loïc Wacquant, Bourdieu’s version of reflexivity differs from those of other theorists in three ways:

First, its primary target is not the individual analyst but the social and intellectual unconsciousness embedded in analytic tools and operations; second, it must be a collective enterprise rather than the burden of the lone academic, and, third, it
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seeks not to assault but to buttress the *epistemological security of sociology*.

(1992, 36, original emphasis)

According to Bourdieu (1975) the operation of the scientific field produces and presupposes a specific form of interest. This means that judgements on a researcher’s scientific capabilities are contaminated at all stages of academic life, by knowledge of the position she/he occupies in the instituted hierarchies (Bourdieu, 1975, pp. 20). The disciplinary field impacts on why, how and what we research, and how we evaluate the research of others in/outside our disciplinary field/s. These fields become the site of a struggle in the legitimacy of various forms of knowledge and the privileging of particular problems for investigation. Those who play the academic game well will then garner greater symbolic profit:

As a system of objective relations between positions already won … the scientific field is the locus of a comprehensive struggle, in which the specific issue at stake is the monopoly of scientific authority, defined inseparably as technical capacity to speak and act legitimately (i.e. in an authorised and authoritative way) in scientific matters. (Bourdieu, 1975, pp. 19)

Therefore, claims to legitimacy in science draw their legitimacy from the relative strength of the groups whose interests they express. Scientific authority becomes a particular form of ‘capital’ which can be ‘accumulated, transmitted and even reconverted into other kinds of capital under certain conditions’ (Bourdieu, 1975, pp. 25). The structure of the scientific field is:

… defined by the state of the power distribution between the protagonists in the struggle (agents or institutions), i.e. by the structure of the distribution of the specific capital, the result of previous struggles which is objectified in institutions
and dispositions and commands the strategies and objective changes of the
different agents or institutions in the present struggles. (Bourdieu, 1975, pp. 27)

In Chapter 9 of this book I consider the impact of claims to scientific legitimacy in the field
of evidence based policing on research and knowledge transfer activities with police
forces in England. The often uncomfortable way in which we might publicly reflect on and
share our accounts of ‘doing’ research or public engagement with groups deemed to be
‘powerful’, such as the police, tells us a great deal about the mechanisms by which
reflexivity operates in a disciplinary sense in sociology and criminology, those settings in
which researcher privilege is most prevalent and in which we are more comfortable
sharing our reflexive accounts of social groups – such as those in more powerless
positions. The process of reflexivity itself can therefore via its unintended consequences
(Lumsden, 2013a) ironically risk reproducing the power imbalances and privilege, which
a ‘reflexive approach’ aims to address.

Reflexive Methods and Methodologies

Feminist Research

Feminist researchers played a crucial role in paving the way for a reflexive approach in
social research, highlighting the androcentric nature of social research and sociology (i.e.
a focus on teaching the ‘founding fathers’ – Marx, Weber and Durkheim, and on
researching public issues, to the neglect of private concerns of relevance to the lives of
women). The myth of ‘hygienic’ research was highlighted and challenged by Oakley
(1981), as were assumptions that the researched are objects not subjects of research,
and that the interview process and the interviewer should be objective and detached.
Feminist standpoint epistemology gives priority to the voices of the less powerful and the
marginalized, and the ways in which the definition of experience varies within feminist
stance theory (Skeggs, 2007 [2001]). For instance, standpoint feminists such as
Dorothy Smith (1997) believe that knowledge springs from experience and that women’s
experience carries with it special knowledge which is necessary to challenge oppression. In Chapter 1 I will detail feminism’s contribution to the development of reflexivity.

Recently, new materialist feminist science studies scholars have critiqued reflexivity arguing that mainstream social science has ignored social factors, and that reflexivity is founded on representationalism which takes for granted the idea that representations reflect reality – social or natural (Barad, 2007). To this extent ‘reflexivity is based on the belief that practices of representation have no effect on the objects of investigation and that we have a kind of access to representations that we don’t have to the objects themselves’ (Barad, 2007, pp. 87). Post-humanist Donna Haraway (1992) has proposed the concept of *diffraction* as an alternative to reflection, arguing that it is a critical practice for making a difference in the world. Barad (2007) claims that where reflection is about mirroring and sameness, diffraction is about difference. For Haraway (1992), reflexivity ‘invites the illusion of essential, fixed position, while [diffraction] trains us to more subtle vision’. In Chapter 2 I will consider feminist discussions of reflexivity in more depth, and argue in response to Haraway and Barad that the concept of reflexivity does still have currency, and that instead of throwing it away and replacing it with diffraction, we should seek to reimagine and redefine reflexivity in relation to social research.

**Ethnography and the ‘Reflexive Turn’**

The second strand of reflexivity in research methods comes in the guise of the reflexive turn which arose out of anthropologists’ and sociologists’ responses to the postmodern critique of ethnography. As Davies (2008) points out, while reflexivity is relevant for social research in general, issues of reflexivity are particularly salient for ethnographers who become closely involved with the societies and cultures of those being studied. In their book *Ethnography* Hammersley and Atkinson (1983) refer to the need for ethnographers to be aware of the influence of various processes on fieldwork, the impact of the social world on this work, the strengths and weaknesses of the data, and to avoid the suggestion that there are universal principles by which knowledge is accepted or

rejected. The reflexive turn in the social sciences was a response to the ethnographic critique of ethnography from sociologists sympathetic to this method (Brewer, 1994, 2000). The critique focuses on issues concerning the reliability of ethnographic descriptions, while also deconstructing the ethnography to show it as a social artefact (Brewer, 1994). It led to a double crisis of representation and legitimation (Denzin & Lincoln, 1998). The crisis of representation arises when the research text is no longer assumed to capture the world which was studied; instead, the world presented in the text is accepted as the construction of the author. The crisis of legitimation arises when it is no longer assumed that research can be evaluated by checking it against the reality which it supposedly represents; this undermines conventional criteria for evaluation such as validity (Taylor, 2001). Denzin (1997) also identifies a third crisis, of praxis which concerns the application of findings. Reflexivity in ethnography will be discussed in Chapter 3.

REFLEXIVITY: ISSUES AND CONCERNS

In the current context there are a number of issues worth mapping out in relation to recent operationalisations and applications of reflexivity or of a reflexive approach, which are explored further in the chapters in this book but which I will also highlight and summarise below:

Reflexivity as Naval-Gazing and Narration of the Self

As alluded to above, reflexivity risks naval-gazing and the narration of the self can be given authority in the research practice, rather than reflexivity. As Beverley Skeggs argues, authority becomes ‘located in the researcher, rather than the research participants; in the textual resourcing of the self, not the practice’ (2004, pp. 152). She believes that it is not re-authorizing ourselves through telling and confession which is needed, but practice which ‘understands the relations of production and is aware of the
possibilities for appropriation; a practice with an awareness of the constraints of
disciplinary techniques and the power relations of location and position’ (Skeggs, 2004,
pp. 131). The researcher must be located in his or her social position and reflexivity
should be dislocated from ‘narrating the self, as a property of persons’ (Skeggs, 2004,
pp. 133). Experience is central here for the construction of subjectivity and theory and it
creates a ‘knowing subject’ whose identity is fluid rather than fixed. It is therefore
important to recognise that knowledge is produced from ‘social subjects with varying
amounts of capital, located in a nexus of power relations’ (Skeggs, 1997, pp. 28). The
Janus-faced nature of reflexivity (May with Perry, 2011) can also be found in the gap
between the knower and knowledge. However, knowledge also cannot be separated
from the knower (Steedman, 1991). This leads Alvesson and Sköldberg (2009, pp. 3) to
suggest that it is useful to assume that a reality exists beyond the ‘researcher’s
egocentricity and the ethnocentricity of the research community’ and that as researchers
we should be able to say something about this reality. This is a view which also
acknowledges the relationships between social reality and the consciousness and
language of people (Alvesson & Sköldberg, 2009).

Reflexivity Creates a Hierarchy of Speaking Positions

We need to avoid using reflexivity as merely another form of privileging certain speaking
positions or voices over others. Lisa Adkins (2002, pp. 340-342) argues that the turn to
reflexivity in social research concerns a configuration of the relation between subjectivity
and knowledge, or knower and known, which allows only certain subjects to speak and to
be viewed as correct via a certain positioning of identity. In this sense, reflexivity
inscribes a hierarchy of speaking positions in social research, the inscription of which is
disguised through claims that reflexivity is ‘good’ and ‘progressive’ with regard to the

Reflexivity is not merely about naval-gazing and reflecting on the experiences of the
researcher, but is also about the way in which knowledge is co-constructed with the
researched. A further point of consideration here is the extent to which reflexivity, in relation to the researched, results in the further privileging of particular voices and the silencing of others. For example, does reflexivity sometimes risk reaffirming social inequalities and injustices? The question posed relates to which contexts and with which social groups researchers are willing to, or able to, publicly reflect, and how they involve the researched in these accounts. In which instances might it be uncomfortable to reflect, risky to reflect, or impossible to publicly reflect on the research experience?

Making reflections public (baring our souls) can have various, often unpredictable, implications for both researcher and researched which must be mindfully considered, anticipated (when possible), and mitigated.

**Reflexivity and the Disciplinary / Academic Field**

We must also consider the politics of reflexivity in practice. As Bourdieu points out, reflexivity acknowledges ‘the limits of knowledge specifically associated with the analyst’s membership and position in the intellectual field’ (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992, pp. 39). This includes not just the social origin and location of the researcher, but also taking account of their position in the academic field and the ‘intellectualist bias which entices us to construe the world as a spectacle, as a set of significations to be interpreted rather than as concrete problems to be solved practically’ (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992, pp. 39).

The identity of the researcher is linked to their discipline/s, methodological and theoretical orientation and as I will explore in Chapter 9, the vast changes in universities as a result of the neo-liberal marketization of academia have implications for the (public) spaces available for reflexivity, reflection and critical thought.

**Reflexivity and the University**

Reflexivity is also shaped by university and higher education contexts. Tim May (with Perry, 2011, pp. 11-12) argues that the conditions of knowledge production in universities can ‘act as inhibitors to reflexivity which requires a supportive context in which to work, as opposed to a celebration of exceptionality through an overblown individualism’. In the
UK and US higher education contexts, concern has been raised regarding the shifts in academic labour to a focus on fast-academia as opposed to slower, contemplative scholarly work which requires space and time for reflection and learning. In the context of fast-academia, there is a risk that research will become institutionalized and managerialized. The neoliberal university consists of ‘a business model that has ushered in: the introduction of high student fees; the incursion of private providers; changing styles of management embedded in NPM [new public management]’ (O’Neill, 2014). Academia consists of a pervasive ‘audit culture’ (Power, 1997; Strathern, 2000) and the rise of the enterprise university (Lumsden & Goode, 2017) has impacted on the doing of social scientific research, what types of research are funded, and thus the individual experiences and career trajectories of the academic. The academic role is increasingly precarious and recently scholars have reflected on their experiences as early-career researchers negotiating the uncertain path to permanent employment, particularly women and scholars from ethnic minorities. In this university context, and also the wider political context including ‘Brexit’ in the UK, academics can also find themselves challenged as experts, accused of being politically aligned or biased, and/or encountering the policing of academic speech and political censorship. For instance, in October 2017 universities criticised the government for deploring ‘McCarthyism’ after Conservative Member of Parliament Chris Heaton-Harris wrote to universities to request lists of teaching staff who were lecturing on Brexit and details of the topics they were covering (Fazackerley, 2017). Although this book focuses primarily on experiences in the British context, it is important to acknowledge that some of these developments in how academia is viewed by the public, and the relationship between university and state, can also be observed across Anglophone jurisdictions.

**Reflexivity and the Funders and Consumers of Research**

Many research funders place emphasis on impact and the applied nature of social research. This includes a focus on the co-production of research, on engagement with research end-users, and on knowledge transfer activities. As engagement and
relationships with various publics and research users become increasingly important for academics in relation to research impact and the enterprise university, reflexivity must also extend to interrogation and analysis of these encounters. In his discussion of ‘public sociology’, Burawoy (2005) is particularly critical of research which serves the needs of the users – what he terms ‘policy sociology’, as there is a danger that the sociologist becomes merely a ‘servant of power’ by sacrificing their scientific integrity. The often uncomfortable way in which we might publicly reflect on and share our accounts of doing research or public engagement with groups deemed to be powerful, such as the police, tells us a great deal about the mechanisms by which reflexivity operates in a disciplinary sense in sociology and criminology, those settings in which researcher privilege is most prevalent and in which we are more comfortable sharing our reflexive accounts of social groups – such as those in more powerless positions. As a sociologist, it is also apparent that sociology in particular (and arts, humanities and other social science researchers) has been placed in a position in which it must defend itself against accusations regarding its ‘usefulness’ in the instrumental neoliberal university. The process of reflexivity itself can therefore via its unintended consequences (Lumsden, 2013a) ironically risk reproducing the power imbalances and privilege, which a reflexive approach aims to address.

**Practicing Reflexivity**

As Finlay (2002) has pointed out, the question in the social sciences is no longer whether to be reflexive but: *how do we go about ‘doing’ or practicing reflexivity?* Despite raising this question more than a decade ago, we appear to be no closer to understanding, debating, or critiquing how we practice reflexivity. Equally – little is said regarding the actual process of reflecting, and which experiences and observations we might consciously reflect on while doing our research, which we may discount or not disclose publicly, and also the value of what I term ‘retrospective reflexivity’ beyond the lifespan of a research project. The diversity of uses of reflexivity make it difficult to know how to apply it in practice (Finlay & Gough, 2003). However, although this book will discuss
reflexive practice and provide examples of reflexivity as writing and reflexivity in action, it is not an attempt to tell the reader how they should ‘do’ reflexivity, and it will not present a ‘tick-box’ list of steps to follow in order to reach the (unattainable) pinnacle of reflexive (self-)awareness and enlightenment.

OVERVIEW OF THE BOOK

In sum, this book is a defence of reflexivity. It also identifies issues and concerns which currently plague some mainstream sociological operationalisations of a positivistic form of reflexivity in some accounts of research. I argue for the extension of reflexivity into domains otherwise neglected in public accounts, and a shift from reflexivity as an individualised quality of the researcher (used to judge peers and to naval-gaze), to a collaborative, reflexive sensibility which is (ethically) mindful of the wider contexts shaping knowledge(s), experience(s), the knower/knowing, and their creation, production, construction, negotiation and contestation. Crucially, a mindful feminist reflexive sensibility and approach seeks to avoid the pitfalls of the present positivist-version-of-reflexivity emerging in predictable reflexive accounts which focus on the latest reflexive fad. It also attends to the gap in relation to reflexivity in theory, method and practice by drawing together scholarly work in each of these domains. Reflexivity remains valuable in social research because it draws attention to the researcher as a part of the world being studied, and reminds us that the individuals involved in our research are subjects, not objects. By being reflexive we acknowledge that we cannot be separated from our biographies. This book is also a defence of reflexivity against the new materialist, post-humanist and post-qualitative critique of reflexivity and the proposition that we use the concept of diffraction instead of reflection/reflexivity (see Barad, 2007, Haraway, 1992).

In what follows, I present examples of reflexivity in various projects at different points in my career thus far, along with two chapters written by colleagues Jackie Goode and Jan Bradford on reflexivity in action and writing as inquiry. I draw on examples from my work.
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on reflexivity from doctoral studies to the present day, focusing on empirical research in a range of contexts and with a range of social groups including those typically deemed to be in societally marginal positions such as (deviant) boy racers, and victims of crime, and those typically perceived to be in powerful positions including institutions such as the police, state and the media (i.e. see Lumsden, 2009; 2013a; 2013b; Lumsden and Winter, 2014; Lumsden, 2016). It is important to note that power is fluid, situational, and slippery and reflexivity is crucial for unearthing these power relations and for considering how they might shape our interactions and engagements with research communities.

Certain individuals within organizations or cultures will be powerless in certain situations, and so may the researcher. Organizations typically deemed to be powerful are not ‘homogenous bodies, with a single ideology, directed from the top by a small, elite group’ (Williams, 1989, pp. 254). Power is subject to situational and contextual circumstances, in addition to the personalities of key players in the organization (Marks et al., 2010). In addition to reflections on the practice of research and relationships with research participants, I discuss the need to consider reflexivity in relation to the co-production of research and in the quest for applied (otherwise referred to as ‘impactful’) research, knowledge transfer, and engagement with key publics and stakeholders via ‘public sociology’ (Burawoy, 2004) or ‘public criminology’ (Loader & Sparks, 2010). I write as a sociologist first and foremost, but also as a scholar whose work crosses into disciplines including criminology and policing studies, and who has engaged in interdisciplinary and multidisciplinary working with academics across the social sciences, but also in disciplines such as engineering and business. The book is structured as follows:

Chapter 1 discusses the development of the reflexive turn by outlining the influence of feminist research. The work of feminists from the 1970s onwards has been crucial for recognizing and drawing attention to the androcentric nature of social research prior to that period: done by men, for men, and in the interests of men. Feminist writers such as Oakley (1981) highlighted the hygienic nature of research accounts which failed to acknowledge that the researcher is part of the world that he/she is studying and that
participants are not merely objects of research. Reflexivity under feminism is about investigating the power embedded in one’s own research and about doing research ‘differently’; the latter of which arises from the ethical and political problems and questions raised by feminists about traditional research methods. The various theoretical and methodological feminist approaches will be outlined, including feminist empiricism and feminist standpoint epistemology; the latter of which gives priority to the voices of the less powerful and the marginalized, and the ways in which the definition of experience varies within feminist standpoint theory. The chapter also provides an overview of postmodern feminism, critical race theory, queer theory and methodologies, and presents examples of reflections from researchers on the impact of gender, race, ethnicity, sexuality, and class, on their research. Feminism paved the way for reflexive accounts, but reflections on racial and ethnic identities and relationships in the field further reflect the dynamics and structures of the academic field.

Chapter 2 discusses new materialism, post-humanism, and post-qualitative critiques of reflexivity and reflection. This includes Donna Haraway (1992) and Karen Barad’s (2007) work on diffraction and diffractive methodologies. Barad (2007) claims that where reflection is about mirroring and sameness, diffraction is about difference. These emerging forms of post-qualitative inquiry propose that we challenge normative assumptions and think differently, ‘within and beyond the reflexive turn’ in order to problematize inquiry, identity, experience and ‘what it means to know and tell’ (Lather, 2013, pp. 638). The chapter outlines the strengths and criticisms of post-qualitative research and diffraction, and then provides a defense of reflexivity which it is argued new materialist analyses have caricatured and traduced. I then argue that instead of replacing reflexivity with diffraction we need to focus on the further development and discussion of reflexivity’s current uses and incarnations as a methodology and methodological tool in qualitative research. Post-qualitative researchers have set reflexivity up as a straw (wo)man in their adoption of an ‘inflationary logic’ (Ahmed, 2008) in which they confuse...
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reflexivity and reflection as both involving ‘mirroring’ and ‘sameness’, when reflexivity has ‘difference’ at its very core.

From the 1960s onwards the taken-for-granted conventions that researchers should strive for objectivity and the authority of the ethnographic text was challenged by the literary and postmodern turn in the social sciences. The reflexive turn arose as a response to the postmodernist critique of ethnography and ethnographic accounts, and as a means of dealing with the double crisis of legitimation and representation. Chapter 3 outlines the development of the reflexive turn in ethnography and then provides an example of reflexivity in practice by drawing on my research with the male-dominated boy racer culture in Aberdeen, Scotland. I focus on the impact of my social location (gender, age and class) and background on the research and on the construction and shaping of researcher identity/ies and relationships with participants. I specifically draw attention to my experiences of gendered interactions including sexist treatment and sexual hustling, and the emotional challenges which arose as a result of these. These examples demonstrate that the researcher’s social position shapes access to the field, relationships with the researched, and the research process itself. Reflecting upon gendered interactions also highlights the ways in which the researched relate to the ethnographer, and provides insight into the dynamics of the social world or culture in question.

Chapter 4 brings together literature on emotional reflexivity and emotions in social research in order to challenge the ‘pleasure principle’ associated with fieldwork (Van Maanen et al., 1993). It is emotional and embodied interactions with the researched which more often than not provide a glimpse into the internal (social) dynamics of a culture, group or the lives of individuals. The chapter begins by discussing the emotionalization of reflexivity, emotional labour, and the embodied nature of reflexivity. It then focuses on examples of emotions in research including ‘hidden ethnography’ (Blackman, 2007), intimacy and friendship as method, sensitive research, and risk and danger in the field. These examples draw attention to the ethical and moral quandaries
which researchers face in the course of their work including how best to respond to
challenging behaviours on the part of the researched and/or gatekeepers, how to ensure
participant and researcher safety, and how to assuage the concerns of ethics boards and
committees while successfully conducting research and doing justice to the stories of
participants. It also considers how emotions can be viewed as ‘data’ in qualitative
research.

Chapters 5, 6 and 7 focus on reflexivity in action, asking exactly what we mean by this in
the context of social research, and interrogating this via three accounts of reflexivity in
action using autoethnography (Ellis, Adams & Bochner, 011) and writing as a method of
inquiry (Richardson & St Pierre, 2005). How is reflexivity experienced, conceptualised,
and written up? Which insights do we acknowledge and document and which do we
ignore or silence? Chapter 5 presents my account of ‘becoming’ an academic in the UK
higher education context. I take us on a journey through critical moments in my academic
career as a sociologist/criminologist in which the position and status of ‘imposter’ was
brought to the fore – often imposed by other players in the academic field. This includes
reflections at the beginning of my career as a Teaching Fellow, reflections on mid-career
via an autoethnographic performance of the managerialist technology of control known
as the performance development review (PDR), and then reflections on present day
experiences of ‘imposter syndrome’ as I move up the shaky ladder of academia. This
enables us to problematize ‘masculinist’ notions of career as a single upward linear
trajectory and to swim around awhile in the sediment, lifting the rocks and peering
underneath at the hidden institutional structures, processes and relationships that
support, constrain or transform the academic lives of women and thereby the academy
itself. The chapter illustrates the value of (performative) autoethnography and writing as a
method of inquiry, in terms of reflecting and writing reflexively.

Chapter 6 by Jan Bradford offers the reader an opportunity to catch glimpses of a
doctoral researcher’s reflexivity in action as Jan reflects on her ongoing struggles to find
the time, energy or mental-physical-bodily capacity to settle in to ‘just write’ as the
domestic, mundane and bewildering confusions of her daily life march in and threaten to
get in the way of her desire to fulfil her academic potential. Through the creative
(psych)analytic practice of writing as a method of inquiry which is informed by a stream-
of-conscious feminine style of writing drawing on psychoanalytic ideas, the chapter
makes use of material written at a three-day Writing Retreat to reflect on formal papers
written and presented at academic conferences as well as informal research diary notes.
Mindful that an anonymous reader is unlikely to ever meet her in person, the writer tries
to convey something of the physical, untidy, beautifully unruly, and messy female
working-class body that sits behind the scenes of the written words that offer some
insight into the inner workings of her mind, as she grapples with coming to terms with
how the demands of her daily life and the ‘baggage’ she carries from her past impact her
research. The chapter gives a sense of transparency and movement in the researcher’s
process of writing-thinking-reflecting over a range of moments, over a period of time, in a
variety of locations, as she takes forward the call made by Jane Speedy (2008) to view
reflexivity as a call towards liminality.

Chapter 7 by Jackie Goode offers an autoethnographic account of a ‘research life’ as an
example of the reflexive self in action. Using notions of vulnerability and precarity, it is an
account which recognises the uncertainties, vulnerability, and contingencies of
individuals’ lives across time and space. Ruth Behar (1997) suggests that the
ethnographer who ‘makes herself vulnerable’ is more likely to be able to produce genuine
insights into the human condition; while Nancy Ettlinger (2007) refers to the ‘intersecting
governmentalities’ that give rise to precarity – governmentalities that operate not only at
the structural/institutional level but at the level of embodied/affective social relations. We
need, she says, to refuse the separation of spheres of life into politics, economics, family,
work and so on, and to reject the separation of rationality and emotions. Following these
authors, and as a sociologist writing an autoethnography of a working life which
examines experiences of precarity arising within and across private, public and political
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spheres, Jackie gives due recognition to the intertwining of the biographical, the historical and the social/structural; and, with earlier feminists, showing through this story of one (white, British, semi-retired) woman’s experience of academic work how reflexivity connects the personal and the political.

Chapter 8 focuses on reflexivity and the role of values in social research, including politics, bias and partisanship and whether we take sides with the subjects of our study. It is argued that objectivity is impossible in social research and thus through adopting a reflexive approach researchers can help to account for the role of values in their work. The chapter draws on the work of Max Weber (1949), Howard Becker's (1967) seminal paper, ‘Whose Side Are We On?’, Alvin Gouldner's (1962) ‘underdog sociology’, contemporary debates on partisanship, and recent research with policy elites, politicians and other powerful groups, to unpack the ways in which power dynamics and values shape the research and what can (or should) be done about it in practice. These issues are explored in relation to my experiences researching the boy racer culture and the reaction of the authorities, media and government. The chapter also highlights how reflexive accounts have tended to involve those studies in which participants are from less powerful or privileged positions, for instance victims of crime, women, subcultures, minority communities, and deviants, while reflections on research with powerful groups has until recently been rare, also highlighting issues around who the research is for, who funds it, and how far public reflections can go.

Lastly, Chapter 9 considers the role of reflexivity in the dissemination of our research findings and in the context of the pressure to evidence the (immediate) impact of social research (whether economic, social or political) by drawing on the example of research and knowledge transfer with police forces in the context of evidence-based policing. This is considered within the wider academic and disciplinary debates on ‘public sociology’ (Burawoy, 2005) or ‘public criminology’ (Loader & Sparks, 2010) and the need for research findings to reach into multiple publics, beyond the traditional academic and user
outputs. The chapter argues that reflexivity and its practice can extend beyond the analysis and writing-up stage, in order to ensure that our engagement and activities with societal groups are conducted in a critical, reflexive and tempered manner. It also demonstrates how reflexive moments in the stages of dissemination can result in insights into how we executed our research, how we related to research participants, and how we constructed and represented their stories and social worlds.

It is hoped that this book will provide readers with valuable examples of the various ways in which reflexivity can be practiced at stages of our research, our intellectual inquiries, and our academic careers. There is no one-size-fits-all-approach to reflexivity. However, a reflexive sensitivity is ever more vital in the current neo-liberal, marketized, masculinist university machine, which pressures us to produce quick (and dirty), quantifiable, useful, applicable and instrumental results in an increasingly fragile post-Brexit landscape in which research and intellectual inquiry seem to be increasingly squeezed and under threat, also raising questions concerning individual autonomy and academic freedom.

The danger is that reflexivity is nudged out of qualitative research because of a lack of the space and time required for reflexivity and reflection in research. Or, that a positivist reflexivity becomes the norm, legitimizing ‘who’ can speak, ‘when’, ‘where’ and if or ‘how’ they have reflected ticks the boxes, therefore assuaging the concerns of those who may be policing the margins of reflexivity and reflexive inquiry in the social sciences.

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1 See Chapter 8 for a discussion of Alvin Gouldner’s response to Weber’s call for a value-free sociology and his contribution to reflexivity in sociology.